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ABSTRACT
MOTIVATIONAL AND ACCESSIBILITY EFFECTS
IN PERSON PERCEPTION
FEBRUARY 1993
ANTHONY O. RILEY, B.S., BROOKLYN COLLEGE
M.A., PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Susan T. Fiske
Two studies examined whether motivation influences the
utilization of accessible trait constructs in person
perception. Previous research shows that perceivers readily
rely on both chronically and temporarily accessible trait
constructs in social information processing. It has been
proposed that this process is automatic in that it does not
require many processing resources, that it occurs
unintentionally, and that it runs autonomously to
completion. The present studies were designed to examine
the generality of these accessibility effects in person
perception. The first study focused on chronically
accessible constructs, and the second on temporarily
accessible constructs. Outcome dependency should motivate
the use of relatively complex information processing
strategies, and so moderate the relatively automatic
reliance on chronically and temporarily accessible
constructs in person perception. Alternatively, to the
iv
extent that the relatively automatic reliance on chronically
and temporarily accessible constructs is immune to
motivation because it is immune to intent, outcome
dependency should not influence whether or not perceivers
u^i-ii-ze either kind of accessible trait constructs in social
information processing. Both of these possibilities were
examined. The results did not support the prediction that
outcome dependency would moderate effects of either
chronically or temporarily accessible trait constructs on
person perception.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT
IV
LIST OF TABLES
Chapter
1 . INTRODUCTION
The Automaticity of Accessibility Effects
on Person Perception
Accessibility Effects and Motivation !!!!!!!!!!! io
2. STUDY 1
Method
Overview
Subjects
Stimulus Materials 20
Procedure 22
Outcome Dependency Manipulation 24
Dependent Measures 25
Results 27
Impression Ratings 27
Free Recall 27
Attention 31
Correlational Analyses 36
Discussion 37
3. STUDY 2 43
Method 43
Overview 43
Subjects 43
Stimulus Materials 44
Procedure 45
Outcome Dependency Manipulation 46
Priming Manipulation 47
Dependent Measures 49
vi
Results
Impression Ratings
Free Recall
Attention
Correlational Analyses
Discussion
APPENDIX: PILOT STUDY.
Method
Subjects and Design
Procedure.
.
Dependent Measures
Results and Discussion.
.
.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
51
51
54
58
60
60
67
67
67
68
69
70
.72
Vll
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Proportion Correctly Free-recalled as
a function of Outcome Dependency,
Behavior Type, and Chronicity 2 9
Reading Time (in seconds) as
a Function of Outcome Dependency,
Behavior Type, and Chronicity 33
Reading Time (in seconds) as a
Function of Set, Behavior Type,
and Chronicity
Proportion Correctly Free-recalled
as a Function of Behavior Type and
Priming
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Ample theory and data support the notion that perceiver
characteristics can affect person perception (for reviews,
see Bargh, 1989; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Markus & Wurf,
1987). Kelly's (1955) Personal Construct Theory, for
example, proposes that over the course of development in a
particular society, or a subculture within that society, one
acguires personalized ways of interpreting one's social
experience. The primary purpose of the personal construct
systems so developed is to predict or anticipate future
events. Thus, the individual construct systems developed
from a person's social experience in a given culture or
subculture serve as a
kind of scanning pattern which a person continually
projects upon his world. As he beeps back and forth
across his perceptual field he picks up blips of
meaning. The more adequate his scanning pattern, the
more meaningful his world becomes (Kelly, 1955, p. 145;
see also Bruner, 1957; Higgins & King, 1981).
Higgins, King, and Mavin (1982) argued that individual
differences in construct accessibility (Bruner, 1957) occur
as a result of individuals' distinct ways of interpreting
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events in their social environment. Moreover, assuming that
these characteristic ways have been frequently used in the
past, individuals should vary with respect to the particular
trait constructs they readily utilize in processing
information from their environment. This is because the
effects of such habitually used trait constructs should be
relatively lasting (Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986;
Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985). The Higgins et al.
(1982) findings were consistent with these claims. in both
their immediate and delayed impressions of the target person
and their immediate and delayed reproductions of the
stimulus information, subjects omitted more inaccessible
than accessible trait-related information. These findings
have been replicated and extended in numerous other
experiments (for recent reviews, see Bargh, 1989; Higgins,
1989; Higgins & Bargh, 1987). Together, they indicate that
individuals' chronically accessible trait constructs are
their focus in encoding and interpreting information about
others in their social environment.
The Automaticitv of Accessibility Effects
on Person Perception
Further research suggests that the effects of either
chronic or short-term trait accessibility on person
perception may be more or less automatic (see Bargh, 1989)
.
To be chronic with respect to a given trait construct means
2
that one habitually utilizes this construct in encoding and
interpreting the behaviors of self and others, and short-
term accessibility refers to the influence of the context in
increasing the likelihood that a certain trait construct
will be used in a similar way. Bargh and Pratto (1986) did
a study on chronic accessibility in which they had yoked
pairs of subjects perform a modified version of the Stroop
color-naming procedure (cf . Stroop, 1935) . Briefly, the
Stroop procedure involves naming as quickly as possible the
color of a given stimulus word presented in any of a variety
of ink colors, for example, "red" printed in black ink.
Presentation of the stimulus word is believed to activate
the word's meaning in semantic memory, causing response
competition between the meaning of the word and the naming
of its ink color. To name accurately and quickly the ink
color of the word, subjects must intentionally inhibit the
meaning of the word. This active inhibition of the meaning
of the word uses up available attentional resources,
however, placing a burden on the limited processing capacity
for naming the ink color and hence slower response times
across trials. Research has shown that the greater the
activation of the competing response (i.e., the word's
meaning)
,
the greater the amount of attentional resources
needed to inhibit it. Warren (1972; cf. Baddeley, 1987,
chapter 6) , for example, found that response times were much
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slower when a strong semantic associate of the target word
was presented just prior to each experimental trial.
In the Bargh and Pratto (1986) study, within a given
pair of yoked subjects, one subject's accessible constructs
were the other subject's inaccessible constructs, and vice
versa. Subjects were presented with a series of trait
constructs, some of which were conceptually related to their
accessible or inaccessible constructs. Their task was to
name the ink color of each trait construct as quickly as
possible.
Bargh and Pratto (1986) predicted that subjects would
take longer to name the ink color of traits that were
conceptually related to their chronically accessible
constructs. They assumed that chronically accessible
constructs are in a constant state of increased activation,
relative to other constructs (Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota,
1986) . As a consequence, there should be interference
effects, due to the activation of the meaning of the
chronically accessible trait constructs, that are similar to
those observed in the Stroop color-naming research. That
is, the meaning of an accessible construct should be
activated upon mere presentation of conceptually related
traits, without the subject's intending this. The result of
the subsequent interference, then, is that response times
for a given subject's accessible constructs should be longer
4
than response times for the subject's inaccessible
constructs
.
This was what the data showed. Response times for
chronics were appreciably longer than response times for
nonchronics, and this pattern was repeated across four
diff®i"snt trait constructs. These findings suggest that
people in general unintentionally (i.e., preconsciously)
attend to the meaning of trait adjectives in social
information processing, in a manner consistent with their
chronically accessible constructs. One of the defining
features of an automatic thought process is that it can
occur unintentionally (Bargh, 1984, 1989). Thus, people for
whom various trait constructs are chronically accessible may
be automatically more sensitive to features related to these
constructs in their social environment.
Another defining feature of an automatic thought
process is that it can occur without awareness (Bargh, 1984,
1989) . In a study demonstrating the awareness criterion for
chronically accessible constructs, Bargh (1982) had
independence schematics and aschematics either attend or not
to independence-related adjectives. Briefly, being
schematic on a given trait dimension is believed to be the
outcome of having had extensive and consistent experience
related to this trait dimension in various social settings
(Markus, 1977; Markus, Smith, & Moreland, 1985). In this
sense, then, schematicity is analogous to chronicity. In
5
this study both schematics and aschematics were unaware of
stimuli presented to the unattended ear, a finding
consistent with earlier research using this dichotic
listening task. More important in this context, however, is
finding that for schematics, processing (i.e.,
shadowing) was facilitated when independence-related
adjectives were presented to the attended ear but noticeably
inhibited when presented to the unattended ear. These
findings indicate that schematics were attending to the
self-related information being presented to both ears but
were doing so in the unattended ear outside of awareness,
which is what the awareness criterion predicts (see Bargh &
Pietromonaco, 1982)
.
A third feature of an automatic thought process is that
it can occur without requiring many processing resources or
without interfering with other, on-going thought processes
(Bargh, 1989) . One might call this the noninterference
criterion. An implication of this criterion is that it
affords social perceivers a degree of information processing
efficiency in encoding and interpreting the behaviors of
others in the complicated world of social interaction (Bargh
& Thein, 1985; also, Gilbert, 1989) . In a test of this
implication, Bargh and Thein showed that, even under
conditions of capacity overload, as often occurs in most
real world settings, chronics recalled stimulus information
inconsistent with their initial, data-based expectancies
6
better than they recalled information consistent with these
expectancies. The inconsistency advantage was eliminated
for nonchronics only when they were overloaded. This study
shows that being chronic with respect to a particular trait
construct affords one an information processing efficiency
in the busy world of social interaction.
Hastie and his colleagues (e.g., Hastie & Kumar, 1979;
for a review and integrative analysis of this literature,
see Hastie & Park, 1986) had previously shown that, in
general, people recall information inconsistent with an
expectancy better than either consistent or neutral
information. Presumably, the distinctiveness of
inconsistent information in the context of consistent
information induces greater elaborative processing and hence
superior recall of such information (see Wyer & Gordon,
1984; Srull & Wyer, 1989; cf. Baddeley, 1987, chapter 2).
Indeed, subjects in the nonoverload conditions in the Bargh
and Thein (1985) study did spend more reading the
inconsistent information than they did reading either the
consistent or neutral information. They also recalled the
inconsistent information better than either consistent or
neutral information. Similarly, Belmore (1987; Belmore &
Hubbard, 1987) found that subjects spent more time reading
inconsistent information than they did reading either
consistent or neutral information. Bargh and Thein,
however, showed that without the necessary processing
7
resources, this recall advantage for inconsistent
information does not hold. So, being chronic on various
trait constructs affords one an information processing
efficiency that then facilitates impression formation, even
when one's attentional resources are overburdened.
In a recent analysis of this and related literature,
Bargh (1989) has effectively debunked the notion that a
given thought process is either entirely automatic or
entirely nonautomatic. Thus, the fact that subjects in the
previously described Bargh and Thein (1985) study intended
to form an impression of the target might lead one to
conclude, on the basis of the unitary definition of
automaticity (see Bargh, 1984, 1989; Logan, 1989), that the
impression formation process is nonautomatic. This
conclusion needs to be qualified, however. True, the
process of forming an impression of the target was
nonautomatic in the specific sense that it was intentional.
What appeared to be automatic in this context was that the
input to the intentional impression formation process was
affected in a manner consistent with subjects' chronically
accessible constructs, as only chronics were able to recall
inconsistent information better than they recalled either
consistent or neutral information under conditions of
capacity overload. Thus, as Bargh (1989) has argued, it is
not the case that the defining features of either an
automatic or nonautomatic thought process necessarily
8
may appear
covary, as these are independent features that
alone or in various combinations. He has contended that it
would be more instructive to examine each of these features
separately.
While the preceding review is not meant to be
exhaustive, it clearly suggests that the information
processing effects of chronic and temporary accessibility on
person perception may be more or less automatic, as they can
occur without intention, without awareness, and without many
attentional resources to monitor them through completion
(Bargh, 1989) . Any particular trait construct may be
utilized in processing information about others. What the
preceding research suggests is that frequent use of a
particular trait construct determines whether or not this
construct is used in processing the ambiguous behaviors of
others. Recent reviews (e.g., Bargh, 1989; Higgins, 1989)
of the temporary accessibility literature indicate that
temporarily activating a particular trait construct in one
context has a similar effect on social information
processing in another context. A number of important
questions are left unanswered, however. Research has shown
that various motivational states can induce subjects to
utilize relatively more complex information processing
strategies (for reviews, see Fiske & Neuberg, 1991; Tetlock,
1985a) . One implication of this research is that these
motivational states may influence the extent to which
9
subjects rely on either chronic or temporarily accessible
trait constructs in making sense of the ambiguous behaviors
of others.
The goal of the present studies was to examine the
influence of one motivational state, outcome dependency, on
the relatively automatic effects of chronically and
temporarily accessible trait constructs on person
perception. Outcome dependency refers to the degree to
which one's rewards or costs are affected by the actions of
others (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher
& Fiske, 1990; for reviews, see Kelley, 1979; Fiske &
Neuberg, 1990; Riley & Fiske, 1991). Recall that an
automatic thought process is said to occur unintentionally,
outside of awareness, and autonomously (see Bargh, 1984,
1989) . By relatively automatic I mean to suggest that if
one or more of these defining features of automaticity is
absent in a on-going thought process, then the process is
less automatic than if all defining features were present.
Examining the influence of outcome dependency on
accessibility effects in the person perception process
should shed some light on the extent to which people can
control their thought processes.
Accessibility Effects and Motivation
The research on chronic and temporary accessibility
effects in person perception accords well with the cognitive
10
miser tradition (Fiske & Taylor, 1984) that has until
recently dominated much of social-cognitive psychology. in
this tradition, the social perceiver is portrayed as a
limited capacity information processor who mostly uses
simple, non-involving heuristic strategies in negotiating
the social environment. Fiske and Taylor (1984, p. 12 )
write in this regard that "The capacity-limited thinker
searches for rapid adequate solutions, rather than slow
accurate solutions. Consequently, errors and biases stem
from inherent features of the cognitive system, not
necessarily from motivations" (see Nisbett & Ross, 1980;
Ross & Nisbett, 1991) . Consistent with this viewpoint,
Bargh et al. (1988, p.600) noted that because chronically
accessible trait constructs are in a consistently activated
(i.e., primed) state, they are more likely to be utilized in
processing ambiguous social information (Higgins & King,
1981; Mischel, 1973). More recent reviews (e.g., Bargh,
1989; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Higgins, 1989) of temporary
accessibility effects suggest a similar conclusion, namely,
that recent use of a given trait construct makes this
construct more likely to be used in processing ambiguous
social information. These findings suggest that both
chronic and temporary accessibility effects in person
perception are due to inherent features of the cognitive
system and not to motivation. So, people for whom various
trait constructs are either chronically or temporarily
11
accessible will often selectively encode and interpret
ambiguous social information in a manner consistent with
these trait constructs, and they do so more or less
automatically.
More recent research, exploring the interface between
social cognition and motivation, has highlighted the need to
modify this perspective of perceivers as cognitive misers
(Fiske, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). As Tetlock and
Boettger (1989; also Tetlock, 1985a) observe, while it is
true that people are cognitive misers much of the time, it
is also true that they are not so all of the time. In a
series of studies on when people are likely to be complex
information processors, Tetlock and his colleagues (e.g.,
Tetlock, 1983a; Tetlock, 1985b; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989)
have shown that accountability, the pressure to justify
one's views to others, leads to integratively complex,
multidimensional social information processing. Tetlock
(1983a), for example, has shown that accountable subjects
utilized more integratively complex information processing
strategies when they expected to justify their views to
individuals with unknown views. And Tetlock and Kim (1987)
found that accountability led subjects to make relatively
more accurate predictions of the responses of stimulus
persons to personality test items.
Turning to outcome dependency specifically, Fiske and
her colleagues (e.g., Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske,
12
1987; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990) have shown in a series of
studies that subjects who were outcome dependent on another
paid increased attention to attribute-based target
information, that is, engaged in more complex information
processing (for a review and integrative analysis of this
literature, see Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Neuberg and Fiske
(1987)
,
for example, found that subjects utilized relatively
individuating impression formation processes in making sense
of the behavior of a stigmatized other on whom they were
outcome dependent and that this effect was mediated by
increased attention to the most informative attribute-based
target information. Erber and Fiske (1984) found that
outcome dependent subjects were more attentive to
information inconsistent with their initial expectancy (and
hence more informative, see Jones & Davis, 1965). Outcome
dependent subjects also made more dispositional attributions
about the inconsistent information than about the consistent
information, presumably to increase their sense of
predictability and control (Heider, 1958; Pittman &
D'Agostino, 1989; Pittman & Heller, 1987).
The studies reported in this paper constitute a
systematic attempt to examine the influence of outcome
dependency on accessibility effects in person perception.
The research on outcome dependency and impression formation
suggests that subjects can be made vigilant information
processors. Typically, in these studies, subjects are
13
either dependent or not on another for some outcome (e.g.
,
team work that can net a $20.00 prize). They then receive
information that is mixed, some consistent and some
inconsistent, with an initial, experimenter-provided
expectancy. The situation motivates outcome dependent
subjects to attend more to inconsistent information, which
is more informative for them, particularly with respect to
issues of predictability and control (Fiske & Neuberg,
1990) . Non-outcome dependent subjects, on the other hand,
need not be concerned about these issues, as their outcome
is not linked to the target's performance in the situation.
Accordingly, they spend less time attending to the
inconsistencies and are less likely to make dispositional
attributions about these inconsistencies. From their
vantage point, these inconsistencies are informative but not
interesting and so there is no need to expend much effort in
accounting for them. Thus, one possibility is that outcome
dependent subjects should be more complex in processing
information about others on whom they depend, with the
result that they would be less likely to automatically rely
on accessible trait constructs in forming impressions of
these others. Alternatively, assuming automaticity is
immune to motivational states because it is immune to
intent, as the study by Bargh and Pratto suggests (1986; cf.
Bargh, 1984, 1989), another possibility would be that even
14
outcome dependent subjects should rely on their accessible
trait constructs in forming impressions of others.
Whether or not outcome dependency moderates the effects
of accessibility on person perception is an important issue.
If outcome dependency motivates the use of relatively
complex, data-driven processing strategies, people should
have the ability to exercise control over the their
seemingly automatic thought processes (Fiske, 1989) . This
would be consistent with the notion that people are not
cognitive misers all the time, but can control their thought
processes when it is in their interest to do, a perspective
on the social perceiver Fiske and Taylor (1991) have labeled
the "motivated tactician." The work of Fiske and her
colleagues, as well as that of Tetlock and his colleagues,
clearly suggests that people can monitor certain impression
processes given sufficient motivation. The work of Bargh
and his colleagues suggests, however, that they do not
always do so, at least not initially in forming an
impression of another. The studies reported in this paper
attempted to reconcile these sets of findings.
In his recent analysis of automaticity in various
social-cognitive processes, Bargh (1989) describes several
categories of automaticity in terms of various enabling
conditions. Goal-dependent automaticity, which is most
relevant in this context, requires for its occurrence
conscious processing of the available information and having
15
a particular goal in mind. As subjects in these study had
an implicit goal of forming an impression of the target, the
type of automaticity being implicated is goal-directed. So,
to form an impression of another, one must be conscious of
the process and have in mind the specific goal of forming an
impression. There are two types of goal-dependent
automaticity in Bargh's taxonomy, unintended and intended
goal-dependent automaticity.
Unintended goal-dependent automaticity describes the
incidental (i.e., unintended) side-effects that are
concomitant to some main intentional process (e.g.
,
studies
on spontaneous trait encoding; for a review, see Newman &
Uleman, 1989). Intended goal-dependent automaticity, on the
other hand, describes a thought process for which both the
instigation and the outcome of the process are intended and
controlled but the process itself runs autonomously to
completion. Intentional goal-dependent automaticity is most
relevant in this context. The argument with respect to this
type of automaticity becomes this; In forming an impression
of the target, not only should outcome dependent subjects be
conscious of the process and have in mind the goal of
forming an impression of the target; they should also exert
greater control over the process than their not-outcome
dependent counterparts. That is to say, outcome dependency
should render the process of forming an impression more
controlled (and, perhaps, less autonomous) by exaggerating
16

CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1
Method
Overview
The present experiment was designed to examine the
influence of Outcome Dependency on chronic construct
accessibility effects in person perception. Two groups of
subjects participated, those who were and those who were not
chronic with respect to the focal personality trait of
friendliness. Subjects read a series of 24 behavioral
descriptions attributed to a target person named Gregory
Cullen who was either mostly friendly but sometimes
unfriendly or mostly unfriendly but sometimes friendly.
Their (implicit) task was form an impression of this person.
Outcome Dependency was manipulated by having half the
subjects dependent on the target for a $20.00 prize and the
remaining half not outcome dependent on the target.
Chronicity, Behavior Type, and Outcome Dependency were
completely crossed. All subjects' working memory capacity
was overloaded by having them subtract 3 from a 6-digit
number (867431) they held in memory after they had read and
reacted to each of the behavioral descriptions. Measures
included the time taken to read and react to each behavioral
description, proportion correctly free recalled of the 24
behavioral descriptions, and impressions of the target
person.
18
Subjects. Fifty-seven University of Massachusetts at
Amherst undergraduates from introductory psychology classes
participated for course credit. Data from 6 of these
subjects were deleted, 4 because they were suspicious about
the behavioral descriptions and 2 because the audiotape
malfunctioned. Three subjects were replaced, 2 because they
did not follow the experimenter's instructions and 1 because
she did not meet the criterion for English-speaking ability
(i.e., having learned the language before the age of 5).
So, data from 51 subjects were included in the analysis.
Subjects were selected for the experiment on the basis
of their responses to a free-response measure of the chronic
accessibility of trait constructs (Higgins et al., 1982,
Study 2) . The selection instrument was administered in two
large introductory psychology classes at the beginning of
the semester. This measure required subjects to list as
many as ten traits they believe best describe each of the
following person types: (a) a type of person they sought
out, (b) a type of person they avoided, (c) a type of person
they liked, (d) a type of person they disliked, and (e) a
type of person they frequently encountered. Each person
type was presented on a separate sheet of paper, and
ordering of the five person types was counterbalanced across
subjects. Output primacy defines a subject's chronically
accessible constructs, which were those given first in
response to the each of the four affect questions (e.g.
,
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sought out, avoided, liked, and disliked)
,
and first and
second to in response to the frequency question. The
Higgins et al. (1982) study showed that subjects
differentiated in this way also differed in the content of
their memories and impressions of the stimulus person along
the relevant trait dimension. In the present study,
subjects were selected as chronics if their chronically
accessible constructs included friendly (or a close synonym
such as outgoing) but not unfriendly
. and as nonchronics if
they never listed friendliness, unfriendliness, or synonyms
of either in any of the up to 50 traits generated. Thirty
chronics and 21 nonchronics participated.
Stimulus Materials . The friendly , unfriendly , and
neutral behavioral descriptions used in this study were
taken from among those used by Hastie and his colleagues
(Hastie, 1980; 1990, personal communication; Hastie & Kumar,
1979) . Examples of behaviors used in this study are
"started a conversation in the elevator" (friendly), "pushed
rudely to the theatre seat" (unfriendly)
,
and "bought the
evening newspaper" (neutral) . The neutral behaviors were
neutral with respect to any personality trait.
Eight lists of 24 behavioral descriptions were
constructed. Each list consisted of 12 friendly (or
unfriendly) behaviors, 6 unfriendly (or friendly) behaviors,
and 6 neutral behaviors. A given subject received a list
comprised of 24 behavioral descriptions. The incongruent
20
behaviors were constructed to be inconsistent with the
impression generated by the 12 mostly friendly or unfriendly
behaviors (Bargh & Thein, 1985; Belmore & Hubbard, 1987).
Within each list two random orderings of the 24 behavioral
descriptions were used, with the constraint that within each
block of 4 behaviors there would be two congruent behaviors,
one incongruent behavior, and one neutral behavior. in
addition, two nonoverlapping sets of incongruent behaviors
were utilized. Set and Presentation Order were included to
insure that the results would not be a function of specific
features of the given behaviors nor of the order in which
the behaviors were presented.
Each subject was randomly assigned to 1 of the 8 list
conditions formed by crossing Proportion of Behaviors (12
friendly, 6 unfriendly, 6 neutral vs. 12 unfriendly, 6
friendly, 6 neutral)
,
Presentation Order, and Set. The
expectancy was created on-line, by the preponderance of
either friendly or unfriendly behavioral descriptions.
An initial expectancy was not included in this study
for several reasons. First, Bargh and Thein (1985) varied
initial expectancy in their study and found that it did not
interact with any of the other variables in their study.
Rather, the mostly friendly or unfriendly behavioral
descriptions led to an expectancy being formed on-line, as
subjects were reading each behavioral description. Second,
Belmore and Hubbard (1987, p. 62; see Belmore, 1987)
21
predicted and found that subjects with an impression set
constructed "a preliminary impression of the target person
on the basis of the first few behaviors and that [this]
generated impression guides the processing of
[additional] behavioral information." Both sets of findings
suggest that a generated impression is in effect equivalent
to an initial expectancy with regard to its information
processing consequences (Martin, 1986, Study 3; for a
review, see Stangor & McMillan, 1992)
.
Procedure . Subjects were run individually. They were
told that the purpose of the study was to see how well two
people work together on a creative task under distracting
conditions. Specifically, they were told that they would
think of educational games for grade school children and
after each game would subtract three from a six-digit number
they would be holding in memory. They were also told that
the person they would be working with had already arrived
and was in a separate room working simultaneously with
another experimenter on some preliminary paper work.
Subjects were told that there were two groups of people in
the experiment. They were told that it was decided
beforehand that people in the first group would have three
acquaintances list behaviors that they had engaged in during
the past month, with the guideline that some of these
behaviors ought to relate to some aspect of their
personality. They were told that people in the second group
22
would provide their own list of behaviors that they had
engaged in during the past month, with the guideline that
some of these behaviors ought to relate to some aspect of
their personality. All subjects were told that they had
been randomly assigned to the second group.
Subjects then filled out a three-page guestionnaire
.
On the first page, they listed their college major,
hobbies/interests, and three personality traits that they
would use to describe themselves. On the second page, they
were instructed to take the first the three traits from the
preceding page and give examples of behaviors they had
engaged in during the past month, which best illustrated
this aspect of their personality. On the third page, they
listed behaviors that they had engaged in during the past
month, which did not pertain to personality (e.g., went to
the dentist) . At this point, they were told that there is a
chance they could win a $20.00 prize in the study, depending
on the quality of their ideas.
After the subject had completed the three-page
questionnaire, the experimenter took it and left the room,
ostensibly to take it to the other experimenter and get the
other subject's statements. These statements had been type-
written on separate index cards, to make them more legible.
The rationale for the exchange of statements was that it was
intended to give the subject and her partner a sense of the
person with whom each will be working later.
23
Outcome Dependency Manipulation
. Subjects read a two-
page description of the conditions for winning the prize.
On the first page, they read that they and the other person
wj-H be thinking up educational games for grade school
snd that they could use the wind—up toys they see
on the table before them as aides. On the second page, they
read the conditions for winning the prize, which varied for
each subject depending on which of the two Outcome
Dependency conditions a subject had been assigned to.
Subjects then signed the second page to indicate that they
had read and understood the conditions for winning the
prize.
Subjects in the Outcome Dependent condition read that
Both you and your partner will complete the task
separately .
The two of you will then discuss your ideas. A $20.00
prize will be given to each member of the best team.
The best team will be judged on what they were able to
work out together in the second part (when you discuss
your ideas) . So you and your partner can both win the
prize as part of the winning team, or another team may
win. There are two prizes, one for the person on the
winning team who started in this room and another for
the person on the winning team who started in the other
room. So you and your partner are not competing.
and those in the Not Outcome Dependent condition read that
Both you and your partner will complete the task
separately . The two of you will then discuss your
ideas. A $20.00 prize will be given to the best
individuals in the study. Each of you will be judged
on the basis of what you were able to alone in first
part (before you discuss your ideas) . Both of you
could win the prize, one you could win the prize, or
neither of you could win the prize. There are two
prizes, one for the person starting in this room
another for the person starting in the other room. So
you and your partner are not competing.
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Subjects in both conditions expected to work together; only
the basis for awarding the $20.00 prize varied across
conditions.
Subjects were then reminded that the purpose of the
study was to examine how well people work under distracting
conditions. They were told that the distraction part of the
study involved continuously subtracting 3 from a 6-digit
number they were to hold in memory after they had thought of
an educational game. To give them practice with this, they
would be given the number now. Specifically, they were
asked to read each description out loud, give their
reactions to it out loud, subtract 3 from the 6-digit number
(867431) and give their answer out loud into the tape-
recorder on the desk, and then go onto the next description
in the set and repeat the same sequence. The experimenter
made sure subjects understood what they were going to do
before turning on the tape-recorder by asking them if they
had any question before starting.
Dependent Measures . Subjects read and reacted out loud
to each of the behavioral descriptions, using the tape-
recorder on the table before them. Tape-recorded reactions
to the behavioral descriptions were transcribed, and from
the transcripts the experimenter later timed how long each
subject spent reading and reacting to each of the three
types of behavioral descriptions. This constituted the
measure of attention. In recording reactions to the
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statements, the experimenter was unaware of which of the
four experimental conditions the subject had been assigned
to. Subjects were then given a surprise free recall test,
in which they were asked to recall as many of the behavioral
descriptions as they could, in any order but as close to the
original wording as possible. This constituted the measure
of the proportion of each type of behavior correctly free-
recalled. In recording recall responses, the experimenter
was unaware of which of the four experimental conditions the
subject had been assigned to.
Subjects then filled out an impression rating form.
The form consists of thirteen 11-point trait rating scales
with endpoints labeled not all X (0) to extremely X (l(n .
Twelve of the rating scales were constructed with traits
that were either related or not, and positive or negative
with respect, to friendliness. The traits comprising the
rating scales were taken from Rogers Thesaurus . Also, the
12 trait rating scales were presented to subjects in a
single random order. The remaining trait scale concerned
the extent to which subjects thought the target was likable.
All subjects were debriefed, given credit, and thanked
for participating in the study. The $20.00 was awarded at
the end of the study.
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Results
Impression Ratings
The impression ratings data were factor analyzed, and
three factors emerged. Subjects' scores on each of these
factors were entered into separate analyses of variance
(ANOVA) involving Outcome dependency and Chronicity. No
significant results were obtained in any of these analyses,
indicating that subjects did not form an overall, on-line
impression of the stimulus person from reading the
behavioral descriptions. Because there was no variation
among the impression ratings as a function of the variables
used in this study, no further analyses were done on these
ratings
.
Free Recall
Subjects were instructed to recall as many of the
behavioral descriptions as they could, in any order but as
close to original wording as possible. These free recall
responses were coded using both lenient and strict criteria
(see Bargh & Thein, 1985) . The lenient criterion required
that only the essential meaning of the presented description
had to be given in the recalled description. The strict
criterion required that the recalled description differed
from the presented description in at most on critical word
(e.g., verb or object), so long as the change
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did not alter the meaning. We will only consider data coded
according to the lenient criterion 1
.
It was predicted subjects who were chronic with respect
to the particular trait construct (i.e., friendliness) would
recall mostly incongruent behaviors, and that this effect
would be more pronounced among outcome dependent subjects.
Specifically, outcome dependent chronics should recall more
incongruent than either congruent or neutral behaviors;
outcome dependent nonchronics should also recall more
incongruent than either congruent or neutral behaviors (but
not as markedly as chronics) . A simple interaction between
chronicity and Behavior Type among not-outcome dependent
subjects was expected such that only chronics should recall
more incongruent than either congruent or neutral behaviors.
No differences in proportion recalled was expected among
not-outcome dependent nonchronics. The predicted pattern
among not-outcome dependent subjects was expected to
replicate the data Bargh and Thein (1985) reported for
subjects in their rapid-paced condition. In their study,
only chronics in the overload condition recalled more
incongruent behaviors. Recall that in this study, subjects'
attentional capacity was overloaded by having them subtract
3 from a 6-digit after they had read and reacted to each
behavioral description (see Pilot Study) . The means
1
.
Findings involving the strict data were similar in all
important respects.
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depicting the predicted Outcome Dependency X Behavior Type X
Chronicity interaction are displayed in Table 1 .
Table 1
Proportion Correctly Free-recalled as a Function ofOutcome Dependency, Behavior Type, and Chronicity
Outcome Dependent
Congruent Incongreunt Neutral n
Chronics
.26
Nonchronics .27
. 32
.35
.47
.45
Not Outcome Dependent
Congruent Incongruent Neutral n
Chronics .37 .40 .46 15
Nonchronics .28 .47
.42 12
Overall, subjects recalled more neutral behaviors (M =
.45) than either incongruent (M = .39) or congruent (M =
.30) behaviors, F (2,94) = 8.60, p < .0001. This result is
contrary to the pattern observed in other studies (e.g.,
Bargh & Thein, 1985; Hastie & Kumar, 1979; for a recent
review, see Stangor & McMillan, 1992) . Contrasts on the
Behavior Type means revealed that while subjects correctly
recalled a greater proportion of incongruent than congruent
behaviors, t (94) = 2.40, p < .03, and a lesser proportion
of congruent than neutral behaviors, t (94) = 4.23, p < .03,
there was no difference in the proportion recalled of
incongruent and neutral behaviors, t (94) = 1.83, ns. No
other significant effects emerged from this analysis.
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The preceding analysis on the free-recall responses was
repeated, with the neutral behaviors dropped. in this
analysis, there was a marginally significant effect of
Outcome Dependency, such that not-outcome-dependent subjects
recalled more behaviors (M =
.38) than did outcome-dependent
subjects (M =
.30), F (1,47) = 2.86, p = .10. Apparently,
the Outcome Dependency manipulation differentially imposed
additional demands on subjects' processing capacity, beyond
the demands of the distraction task. There was also main
effect of behavior type in this analysis, F (1,47) = 8.42, p
< .006. Subjects recalled more incongruent (M = .39) than
congruent (M = .30) behaviors. This pattern is consistent
with the findings of earlier research using a similar
paradigm (e.g., Stangor & Duan, 1991).
The variables used in generating the stimulus lists
affected subjects' free recall responses. Order,
Proportion, and Set were each used in three separate four-
factor analyses of variance. Overall, there were no main or
interaction effects involving Order. The analysis involving
Proportion revealed no main effect of this variable on the
recall measure, F (1,43) < 1, ns. There was a marginally
significant interaction between Chronicity and Proportion, F
(1,43) = 3.25, p = .08. Chronics recalled more of
proportion 2 (i.e., mostly unfriendly) (M = .42) than of
proportion 1 (i.e., mostly friendly) (M = .35) behaviors,
whereas nonchronics recalled more of proportion 1 (M = .393)
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than proportion 2 (M = .36). There was also a significant
Outcome Dependency X Proportion interaction, F ( 1 , 43 ) =
4.72, p < .05, with outcome-dependent subjects recalling
more of proportion 1 (M =.37) than of proportion 2 (M = .33)
behaviors and not-outcome- dependent subjects recalling more
of proportion 2 (M = .46) than of proportion 1 (M = .36)
behaviors. In the analysis involving Set, there were no
reliable effects of this variable on recall.
Attention
All subjects read and reacted out loud into a tape-
recorder to each of the twenty-four behavioral descriptions.
Each subject's average reading and reaction time for the 12
friendly (or unfriendly)
,
the 6 unfriendly (or friendly)
,
and the 6 neutral behaviors was calculated from these tape-
recorded reactions. These data were submitted to an Outcome
Dependency X Behavior Type X Chronicity mixed-model analysis
of variance (ANOVA)
,
with repeated measures on Behavior
Type.
The prediction with regard to attention was that
subjects who were chronic with respect to the particular
trait construct (i.e., friendliness) would attend most to
the incongruent behaviors, and that this effect would be
more pronounced among outcome—dependent subjects.
Specifically, outcome-dependent chronics should attend most
to incongruent behaviors, moderately to congruent behaviors,
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and least to neutral behaviors; and outcome-dependent
nonchronics should also (but not as markedly as chronics)
attend most to incongruent behaviors than to either of the
other two types of behaviors. A simple interaction between
Chronicity and Behavior Type among not-outcome dependent
subjects was expected such that only chronics should attend
most to incongruent behaviors, moderately to congruent
behaviors, and least to neutral behaviors (but not as
markedly as outcome dependent subjects)
. No differences in
attention to the three types of behavior were expected among
not-outcome dependent nonchronics. Recall that in this
study all subjects' attentional capacity was overloaded by
having them engaged in a distraction task, after they had
read and reacted to each behavioral description. The means
assessing this predicted Outcome Dependency X Behavior Type
X Chronicity interaction are displayed in Table 2.
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Table 2
Reading Time (in seconds) as a Function ofOutcome Dependency, Behavior Type, and Chronicity
Outcome Dependent
Congruent Incongruent Neutral n
Chronics 8.45 8.58 7.51 13
Nonchronics 8.51 8.71 6.98 9
Not Outcome Dependent
Congruent Incongruent Neutral n
Chronics 8 . 16 8.81 7.49 14
Nonchronics 9.24 9.58 8.19 12
Note: Data from three subjects were dropped because their
scores for each behavior type were 3 standard deviations
away from the mean for each behavior type.
Only a main effect for behavior type emerged from this
analysis. Overall, subjects attended more to the
incongruent (M = 8.916) and congruent behaviors (M = 8.582)
than they did to the neutral behaviors (M = 7.574), F (2,88)
= 10.18, p < .0001. There are prior theoretical and
empirical reasons to expect that the amount of time spent
attending to the incongruent behaviors would be greater the
time spent attending to the congruent behaviors and that
attention to each would in turn be greater than attention to
the neutral behaviors. The present analysis did not bear
out this expected pattern. When the analysis was repeated,
with the neutral behaviors dropped, the effect disappeared,
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F (1,44) < 1, indicating that there was no significant
difference between congruent and incongruent behavior type
means. Overall, then, subjects attended more to the
relevant than to the irrelevant behaviors. These findings
suggest that the neutral behaviors were responsible for the
overall effect of behavior type on attention.
The variables used in generating the lists of
behavioral descriptions (Order, Set, and Proportion)
unexpectedly affected these results. Three separate four-
factor mixed model analyses of variance (ANOVA) were done on
the reading time data, each involving one of the factors
used in making up the behavioral descriptions. We will
consider each in turn. There were no main or interaction
effects involving Order.
There was no overall effect of Proportion on reading
time, F (1,44) < 1. However, there was a marginally
significant Chronicity X Proportion interaction, F (1,40) =
3.53, p = .07. Nonchronics (M = 9.86) attended more to
proportion 1 (i.e., mostly friendly) behaviors than did
chronics (M = 7.71); and chronics attended more to
proportion 2 (i.e., mostly unfriendly) behaviors than did
nonchronics (Ms are 8.73 and 7.46, respectively). Also,
there was a significant interaction involving Behavior Type
and Proportion, F (2,80) = 7, p < .002, indicating that the
attention advantage for incongruent behaviors was obtained
on proportion 1 lists but not on proportion 2 lists. So,
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attention to the incongruent behaviors only occurred when
these behaviors were also negative.
The analysis involving Set revealed no overall effect
of this variable on reading time, F (1,40) < l. There was a
marginally significant interaction involving Set, Outcome
Dependency, and Behavior Type, F (2,80) = 2.92, p = .06.
Recall that Set refers to the two nonoverlapping sets of
incongruent behaviors included in the behavioral
descriptions. For set 1 behaviors, the attention advantage
for incongruent (compared to congruent) behaviors was
obtained for subjects who were not outcome dependent but not
for those who were outcome dependent; for set 2 behaviors,
both groups of subjects recalled more congruent than
incongruent behaviors. There was an interestingly
significant Set X Behavior Type X Chronicity interaction, F
(2, 80) = 3.04, p = .05. As shown in Table 3, the expected
efficiency that obtains from being chronic with respect to a
particular trait construct apparently held only for set 2
behaviors. Subsequent analyses showed that neither simple
interaction between Chronicity and Behavior Type at either
level of Set was significant. Yet the pattern of the means
at the second level of Set is suggestive.
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Table 3
Reading Time (in seconds) as a Function of Set,
Behavior Type, and Chronicity
Set 1
Chronics
Congruent
8.74
Incongruent
8.73
Neutral
8.14
n
16
Nonchronics 9.86 10.63 8.24 9
Chronics
Congruent
7.70
Set 2
Incongruent
8.64
Neutral
6.57
n
11
Nonchronics 8.14 8.23 7.25 12
The unexpected influence of the factors used in
generating the lists of behaviors subjects read is puzzling
in light of previous research. The findings described so
far suggest that the effects of chronicity in this study may
not be generalizable study across Proportion and Set.
Correlational Analyses
Identical predictions for both the attention and recall
data were made on the assumption that attention should
mediate recall (see Bargh & Thein, 1985) . As it is
difficult to assess this assumption directly from the
findings reported so far, three sets of correlations between
attention and recall were computed (as in Bargh & Thein,
1985) : for the congruent behaviors, for the incongruent
behaviors, and overall for the three behavior types
combined.
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Overall
,
the correlation between attention (i.e.,
reading time) and proportion correctly recalled for all
three types of behaviors was significant, r =
.35, t (49) =
2.63, p < .05. The correlation between attention and free
recall of the congruent behaviors was not significant. This
is consistent with Bargh & Thein's (1985) results. The
correlation between attention and free recall of the
incongruent behaviors was moderate and significant, r = .28,
t (49) = 2.33, p < .05.
Overall, the correlational analyses offered some
support for the assumption that attention mediated recall of
the three behavior types combined and of the incongruent
behaviors. In both cases, the correlation was positive (but
moderate)
,
as one would expect if the assumption were true.
Discusssion
The results from the impression ratings analysis
indicated that subjects did not form an overall, on-line
impression of the target on the basis of reading the
behavioral descriptions. This is inconsistent with earlier
research. As pointed out earlier, Bargh and Thein (1985)
manipulated initial expectancy and found that it did not
affect any of the other variables in their study. Instead,
they found that subjects formed an on-line impression of the
target on the basis of reading the stimulus information.
Forming an initial, on-line impression of the target is an
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important first step in the process that was the focus of
this study, namely, whether outcome dependency would affect
the chronic accessibility of trait constructs in impression
formation.
On the recall measure, we had expected that subjects
would recall mostly incongruent behaviors and that this
effect would be moderated by outcome dependency. Analyses
of the recall data did not support this prediction.
Overall, subjects did differentiate between the neutral and
relevant behaviors, but there was no difference in the
proportion of incongruent and congruent behaviors recalled.
When the analysis was repeated on only the congruent and
incongruent behaviors, a marginally significant main effect
of outcome dependency was obtained. Not-outcome- dependent
subjects recalled more of the behaviors than did outcome-
dependent subjects. This suggests that the Outcome
Dependency manipulation created an additional demand on
subjects ' s processing capacity, above and beyond that
created by the distraction task in which all subjects
engaged (see Pilot study) . It appears, then, that the whole
procedure in Study 1 was probably overwhelming the subjects.
Also, when the neutral behaviors were dropped from the
analysis, the pattern of the Behavior Type main effect
changed such that subjects recalled more incongruent than
congruent behaviors. Apparently, subjects were able to
detect the inconsistency in the information presented to
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them. Subsequent analyses suggest that the neutral
behaviors were sufficiently unusual to undermine the usual
inconsistency effect, that is, enhanced recall of
inconsistent information. This finding is contrary to the
findings in earlier research using a similar paradigm.
It was hypothesized that subjects would attend most to
the incongruent behaviors and that this effect would be
moderated by outcome dependency. The analyses of the
attention data did not support this prediction. Subjects
attended more to the relevant than to the neutral behaviors.
Specifically, they paid more attention to both incongruent
and congruent behaviors than they did to neutral behaviors.
When the neutral behaviors were dropped from the analysis,
the main effect of Behavior Type on attention became
nonsignificant. There was no difference in the amount of
attention paid to either incongruent or congruent behaviors.
The pattern in the recall data was opposite to that in
the attention data. Subjects recalled more neutral than
either incongruent or congruent behaviors, whereas they
attended most to the incongruent and congruent behaviors
than to the neutral behaviors. Taken together, these
findings are inconsistent with the data reported by Bargh
and Thein (1985). In their study, subjects recalled more
and attended most to the incongruent behaviors. These
contradictory findings across the two studies are
inexplicable in light of the basic similarity underlying the
39
models that were tested in Bargh and Thein's study and in
this study. One possible reason for the contradictory
findings might have been the difference in procedures of the
two studies. Though every attempt was made to create a
situation analogous to that in the rapid-paced condition in
the Bargh and Thein study, it appears that it was not
successful
.
Two of the three factors used in generating the lists
of behaviors, proportion and set, unexpectedly affected the
results of this study. This is another limitation of this
study, for it suggests that unlike in Bargh and Thein
(1985)
,
the results of this study are not generalizable
across either proportion or set. There was an interesting
apparent replication of the Bargh and Thein (1985) finding
for chronics in the rapid-paced condition. The efficiency
associated with being chronic on a given trait construct was
demonstrated, but only for Set 2 behaviors. So, this effect
is not generalizable across set (see Table 3 and discussion
in text)
.
Identical predictions were made for the recall and
attention data on the assumption that attention should
(though not entirely) mediate recall (see Bargh & Thein,
1985) . To evaluate this assumption, three sets of
correlations were computed (as in Bargh & Thein, 1985)
between attention and recall. Overall, the correlation
between attention and recall for all three types of behavior
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was significant. The more attention subjects paid to the
information, the greater the proportion of three types of
behaviors recalled. Also, there was a significant
correlation between attention and recall of the incongruent
behaviors, indicating that the more attention paid to the
incongruent behaviors, the greater the proportion of such
behaviors recalled. There were no other significant effects
in this analysis. Taken together, the findings suggest that
attention mediated recall to a moderate extent.
A main problem with Study 1 is the relatively small
sample size used. There were only 51 subjects in this
study. With this in mind, a second study was designed in
which an attempt was made to increase the sample size. The
distraction task used in Study 1 was not used in Study 2
,
because in Study 1 it appeared that this task in combination
with the outcome dependency manipulation was creating
unnecessary demands on subjects' processing capacity.
Temporary accessibility was manipulated in Study 2, as it
was more convenient than prescreening subjects on
chronicity. The predictions in Study 2 were the same as in
Study 1, because temporary accessibility is conceptually
equivalent to chronic accessibility. The only important
difference is that one refers to short-term accessibility,
as occurs in contextual or situational priming, and the
other to long-term accessibility, which is due to long-term
experience in using particular trait constructs (e.g.,
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socialization experience; see Bargh, 1989; Higgins, 1989).
Thus, the goal in the second study was to see whether
outcome dependency would moderate the effects of temporary
accessibility on person perception.
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2
Method
Overview
The present experiment was designed to examine the
influence of outcome dependency on temporary trait
accessibility effects in person perception. Two groups of
subjects participated, those who were primed on traits
related to honesty and those who were primed on traits not
related to honesty. Subjects then read a series of 24
behavioral statements attributed to a target person named
Gregory Cullen who behaved either mostly honestly but
sometimes dishonestly or mostly dishonestly but sometimes
honestly. Outcome dependency was manipulated by having half
the subjects dependent on the target for a $20.00 prize and
the other half not dependent on the target. Priming
(related vs unrelated)
,
Behavior Type (congruent,
incongruent, and neutral behavioral descriptions) , and
Outcome Dependency were completely crossed. Measures
included the time taken to read and react out loud to each
behavioral description, proportion correctly free recalled
of each type of behavioral description, and impressions of
the target person.
Subjects . Forty University of Massachusetts at Amherst
undergraduates participated. Subjects were run individually
in one of the four groups created by crossing Priming and
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Outcome Dependency. Reading time data for five subjects
were not collected because the tape-recorder malfunctioned.
Stimulus Materials . The honest, dishonest, and neutral
behavioral descriptions used in this study were taken from
among those used by Hastie and his colleagues (Hastie, 1981;
personal communication, 1990; Hastie & Kumar, 1979).
Examples of behaviors used in this study are "searched for
the owner of the lost wristwatch" (honest)
,
"did not report
hitting the car" (dishonest)
,
and "went to a funeral"
(neutral) . The neutral behaviors were neutral with respect
to any personality trait.
Eight lists of 24 behavioral descriptions were
constructed. Each list consisted of 12 honest (or
dishonest) behaviors, 6 dishonest (or honest) behaviors, and
6 neutral behaviors. The 6 dishonest (or honest) behaviors
were constructed to be evaluatively incongruent with the the
12 honest (or dishonest) behaviors. Within each list, two
random orderings of the 24 behavioral descriptions were
used, with the constraint that within each block of 4 there
would be 2 honest (or dishonest) behaviors, 1 dishonest (or
honest) behavior, and 1 neutral behavior. Also, two
nonoverlapping sets of inconsistent behaviors were used.
Set and Presentation Order were included to insure that the
results would be generalizable across specific features of
the behaviors and the order in which the behaviors were
presented
.
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Each subject was randomly assigned to 1 of the 8 list
conditions formed by crossing Proportion of behaviors (12
honest, 6 dishonest, and 6 neutral versus 12 dishonest, 6
honest, and 6 neutral behaviors)
,
Presentation Order, and
Set. The initial expectancy was expected to form on-line,
by the preponderance of either honest or dishonest
behaviors. An initial expectancy was not included in this
study for the reasons described in the first study.
Procedure
. Subjects were told that the purpose of the
study was to see how well two people work together on a
creative task, namely, thinking up educational games for
grade school children. They were also told that the person
with whom they will be working had already arrived and that
he was in a separate room working with another experimenter.
Subjects were told that there were two groups in the
experiment, that it was decided beforehand that people in
the first group were to have three acquaintances list
behaviors they had engaged in during the past month, with
the guideline that some of these behaviors ought to relate
to some aspect of their personality; and that people in the
second group were to provide their own list of behaviors
they had engaged in during the past month, again with the
guideline that some of the behaviors ought to relate to some
aspect of their personality. They were told that they had
been randomly assigned to the second group.
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Subjects then filled out a three-page questionnaire.
On the first page, they listed their college major,
hobbies/ interests, and three personality traits that they
would used to describe themselves. On the second page, they
were asked to take the first of the three traits from the
preceding page and give examples of behaviors that they had
engaged in during the past month, that best illustrate this
aspect of their personality. On the third page, they listed
behaviors that they had engaged in during the past month,
that did not pertain to personality (e.g. went to the
dentist) . At this point, they were told that there was a
chance they could win a $20.00 prize in the study, depending
on the quality of their game ideas.
After the subject had completed the three-page
questionnaire, the experimenter took it and left the room,
ostensibly to take it to the other experimenter and get the
other subject's statements. These statements had been hand-
written by three individuals on separate index cards, to
make them more readable. The rationale for the exchange of
statements was to give the subject and the other person a
sense of the person with whom they will be working later.
Outcome Dependency Manipulation . Subjects then read a
two-page description of the conditions for winning the
prize. On the first page, they read that they and the other
person will be thinking up educational games for grade
school children and that they could use the wind-up toys on
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the table before them. On the second page, they read the
conditions for winning the prize, which varied for each
subject depending on the Outcome Dependency condition to
which the subject had been assigned. Each subject then
signed the second page, to indicate that she had read and
understood the conditions for winning the prize.
Subjects in the Outcome Dependent condition read that
Both you and your partner will complete the task
separately
. The two of you will then discuss your
ideas. A $20.00 prize will be given to each member of
the best team. The best team will be judged on the
basis of what they were able to work out together in
the second part (when you discuss your ideas)
. So you
and your partner can both win the prize as part of the
winning team, or another team may win. There are two
prizes, one for the person on the winning team who
started in this room and another for the person on the
winning team who started in the other room. So you and
your partner are not competing.
And those in the Not-outcome Dependent condition read that
Both you and your partner will complete the task
separately . The two of you will then discuss your
ideas. A $20.00 prize will be given to the best
individuals in the study. Each of you will be judged
on the basis of what you were able to work out alone in
the first part (before you discuss your ideas) . Both
of you could win the prize, one of you could win the
prize, or neither of you could win the prize. There
are two prizes, one for the person starting in this
room and another for the person start in the other
room. So you and your partner are not competing.
Note that subjects in both conditions expected to work
together; only the basis for awarding the $20.00 prize
differed across conditions.
Priming Manipulation . The experimenter then announced
that he was about 4 or 5 minutes ahead of the other
47
experimenter and asked the subject if she would be willing
to help the other experimenter on a study she was planning
to run in the Fall semester. He said that since this is the
first time he was seeing this study, it would be better that
he and the subject read the instructions together. This
second, unrelated study was said to be a study on the
effects of information processing on perception. The
experimenter gave the subject 11 folders, in each of which
was a colored piece of paper with a word written on it.
The subject was to listen for a memory word, repeat the
memory word out loud, silently read the word printed on the
colored piece of paper in the folder to, name the color of
the paper in the folder out loud, and then repeat the memory
word out loud. The first of the 11 folders was for
practice. The subject was told to keep the piece of paper
with the instructions on the table before her, so she could
refer to it if necessary. For subjects in the Priming-
related condition, 4 of the 10 memory words on the
nonpractice trials were trait adjectives related to honesty
(trustworthy, honorable, truthful, and reliable). And for
subjects in the Priming-unrelated condition, 4 of the 10
memory words were trait adjectives not related to honesty
(mature, open-minded, clean, and happy) . The trait
adjectives in both the Priming-related and Priming-unrelated
conditions were taken from Anderson's (1968) list, equated
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for likability and meaningfulness, and always occupied the
same positions in the series (3rd, 5th, 7th, and 8th).
The remaining memory words were common nouns and were
the same in both the Priming-related and Priming-unrelated
conditions (e.g. newspaper, bookcase, etc.) Note that in
the two conditions, subjects had to hold each of the 10
memory words in short-term storage for an brief period of
time. This priming procedure was a modification of the
procedure developed by Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) in
their study on category accessibility and impression
formation, and was expected to render entire trait
categories (not just trait words) temporarily accessible
(cf
.
Sedikides, 1990)
.
this point, subjects received the 24 behavioral
descriptions and written instructions on what to do. They
were reminded that these statements about their partner were
from three different people, although many of them might
relate to a particular trait adjective. Also, they were
told that their reactions to each statement would be held in
complete confidence. Subjects read each statement and gave
their reactions to it out loud into a tape-recorder that was
on the table before them.
Dependent Measures . After reading and reacting out loud
to each of the behavioral statements, subjects were asked to
name as many of the 50 states in the US as they could in 2
minutes. Next, they received a surprise free-recall test,
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on which they were asked to recall as many of the behavioral
statements as they could, in any order but as close to the
original wording as possible. There was no time limit on
this free-recall task.
After the free-recall test, subjects rated the target
person on 14 11-point trait scales, with endpoints labeled
not at all x (0) to extremely x no). Twelve of the trait
scales were either related or not related to the focal trait
of honesty and either positive or negative. The traits
comprising these scales were taken from Rogers Thesaurus .
The remaining two scales, respectively, evaluated the extent
to which subjects thought the target was honest and likable.
Subjects were then asked to explain in their own words
what were the conditions for winning the prize. Also,
subjects were given a list of 20 words, 10 of which were the
memory words. They were asked to place a checkmark next to
each word they believed was old (i.e., had been seen before)
and each word they believed was new (i.e.
,
had not been seen
before) . There were separate lists for each of the two
priming conditions.
All subjects were debriefed, given credit, and thanked
for participating in the study. The $20.00 prize was
awarded at the end of the study.
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Results
Proportion correctly recalled, attention, and
impression ratings were measured. Unlike Study 1, category
accessibility was manipulated. Another important difference
is that in this study no attempt was made to overload
subjects 's short-term memory. in all other respects,
however, Study 2 is conceptually similar to Study 1. As
k^fore, the issue was whether or not outcome dependency
would moderate the impact of accessibility effects on person
perception.
Impression Ratings
We will consider the impression ratings data first, as
it is important to establish that subjects formed an
expectancy on the basis of reading the behavioral
statements. The first 12 trait scales were combined into 4
groups, each corresponding to the related or unrelated and
positive or negative traits. A Proportion (mostly honest
vs. mostly dishonest behaviors) X Priming (related vs.
unrelated traits) X Outcome Dependency (outcome dependent
vs. not-outcome dependent) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
performed on these combined ratings. Also, a similar ANOVA
was performed on the honesty and likability ratings.
Subjects who read the mostly honest behaviors (M =
6.98) had a more positive impression of the target than did
subjects who read the mostly dishonest behaviors (M = 4.73),
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on the combined positive/related trait ratings (i.e.,
upright, candid, and frank), F (1,32) = 26. 05, p < .0001.
The effect size index, omega sqaure, associated with this
result is .39 . Similarly, on the combined
positive/unrelated trait ratings (i.e., kind, gentle,
tender)
,
subjects who read the mostly honest behaviors (M =
5.80) had a more positive impression of the target than did
subjects who read the mostly dishonest behaviors (M = 4.37),
F (1,32) = 10.35, p < .03. The value of omega squared
associated with this effect is .19. So, for the positive
traits, the relative effect sizes indicated that the related
trait ratings accounted for more of the variance in the
impression ratings data than did the unrelated trait
ratings.
There was a main effect on the combined negative
/related trait ratings (i.e., immoral, deceitful, crafty),
such that subjects who read the mostly dishonest behaviors
(M = 3.58) had a more negative impression of the target than
did subjects who read the mostly honest behaviors (M =
5.55), F (1,32) = 18.77, p < .001. The value of omega
squared associated with this effect is .31. On the combined
negative/unrelated trait ratings (i.e., mean, stingy,
greedy)
,
there was an effect such that subjects who read the
2. Effect sizes are reported to indicate the magnitude of the
effect each main effect accounts for in the impression
ratings analyses.
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mostly dishonest behaviors (M = 3.10) also formed a more
negative impression of the target than did those who read
the mostly honest behaviors (M = 4.37), F (1,32) = 7.52, p <
.02. The value of omega squared associated with this effect
is .14. Again, for the negative traits, the related trait
ratings accounted for more of the variance than did the
unrelated trait ratings.
Further support for the notion that subjects formed an
on-line impression of the target comes from subjects who
read the mostly honest behaviors, who judged the target as
more honest (M = 6.95) than did subjects who read the mostly
dishonest behaviors (M = 3.75), F (1,32) = 32.90, p < .0001.
Moreover, those who read the mostly honest behaviors rated
the target as more likable (M = 7.00) than did those who
read the mostly dishonest behaviors (M = 5.50), F (1,32) =
9.38, p < .004.
These findings are important in that they show that
subjects formed a clear on-line impression of the target
person, as they were reading the behavioral descriptions,
and that this impression affected how favorably they judged
the person whom they were about to meet. Subjects who read
the mostly honest behaviors had an overall positive
impression of the target and, as indicated by the relative
effect size indices, this effect accounted for more of the
variance on the combined positive/related trait ratings than
on combined positive/unrelated trait ratings. Similarly,
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subjects who read the mostly dishonest behaviors had an
overall negative impression of the target person and, again
as indicated by the relative effect size indices, this
effect accounted for more of the variance on the combined
negative/related trait ratings than on the
negative/unrelated trait ratings. Thus, subjects created an
overall, on-line expectancy, that was either positive or
negative, depending on the whether they had read mostly
honest or dishonest behaviors.
Free recall
Proportion free-recalled of the three types of
behavioral descriptions (i.e.. Congruent, Incongruent, and
Neutral) were coded using two criteria (see Bargh & Thein,
1985) . The lenient criterion required that only the
essential meaning of the presented description had to be
given in the recalled description. The strict criterion
required that the recalled description differed from the
presented description in at most one critical word (verb or
object)
,
so long as the change did not alter the meaning.
In coding proportion correctly recalled, the experimenter
was unaware of the experimental condition to which the
subject had been assigned. We will only consider data coded
according to the lenient criterion 3 .
3
. Findings involving the strict recall data were similar in
all important respects.
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We predicted that subjects who were primed on
constructs related to honesty would recall mostly
incongruent behaviors, and that this effect would be would
more pronounced among outcome- dependent subjects.
Specifically, outcome-dependent subjects who were primed on
related constructs should recall more incongruent than
either congruent or neutral behaviors; and outcome-dependent
subjects who were primed on unrelated constructs should also
(but not as markedly) recall more incongruent than either
congruent or neutral behaviors. A simple interaction
between Priming and Behavior Type among not-outcome
dependent subjects was expected such that only subjects
primed on related constructs should recall more incongruent
than either congruent or neutral behaviors. No differences
in recall were expected among not-outcome dependent subjects
primed on unrelated constructs.
An Outcome Dependency X Behavior Type X Priming mixed-
model analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the
proportion of each type of behavior correctly recalled, with
Priming and Outcome Dependency as the between-subjects
factors and Behavior Type as the within-subjects factor.
Order and Set did not affect any of the analyses reported
here. Overall, outcome-dependent subjects (M = .45)
recalled more behaviors than did not—outcome— dependent
subjects (M = .34)
,
F (1,36) = 5.20, p < .02. This
suggests that outcome dependent-subjects processed the
55
information more carefully overall than did their not-
outcome- dependent counterparts. (Note that this result
opposes Study 1
.
)
As expected, subjects recalled more incongruent (M =
.50) than either congruent (M =
.37) or neutral (M = .32)
behaviors, F (2,72) = 6.28, p < .01. Contrast analyses on
these means indicated that the incongruent mean differed
significantly from each of the other two means at p < .02.
The congruent and the neutral means did not differ from each
other. Interestingly, this Behavior Type main effect was
qualified by a significant Priming X Behavior Type
interaction, F (2,72) = 4.75, p < .04. As displayed in
Table 4, only subjects who were primed on related contructs
recalled more incongruent than either congruent or neutral
behaviors. Simple effects analyses on this Priming X
Behavior Type interaction indicated that only subjects
primed on related constructs recalled more incongruent
behaviors, F (1,38) = 4.82, p < .04.
Table 4
Proportion Correctly Free-Recalled as a Function of
Behavior Type and Priming
Behavior Type
Congruent Incongruent Neutral
Prime-
related .34 . 62
Prime-
unrelated .40 .39
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.29 20
.36 20
The expected Outcome Dependency X Behavior Type X Priming
interaction was not significant.
The preceding analyses were repeated, with the neutral
behaviors dropped. As before, there was a Behavior Type
main effect, F (1,36) = 5.59, p < .03, and a Priming X
Behavior Type interaction, F (1,36) = 5.98, p < .03. The
pattern in both cases was the same as in analyses involving
all three types of behaviors. There was also a marginally
significant Outcome Dependency X Priming effect, F (1,36) =
3.22, p = .08. Outcome dependent-subjects primed on related
constructs recalled more behaviors than did outcome-
dependent subjects primed on unrelated constructs (Ms are,
respectively, .57 and . 37), whereas not-outcome-dependent
subjects primed on related constructs recalled fewer
behaviors than did not-outcome-dependent subjects primed on
unrelated constructs (Ms are, respectively, .39 and .49).
That is, Outcome Dependency reversed the effect on recall,
although only marginally. There was a significant Behavior
Type X Outcome Dependency interaction, F (1,36) = 4.42, p <
.05. Outcome dependent subjects recalled more incongruent
(M = .59) than congruent (M = .36) behaviors, whereas not-
outcome-dependent subjects did the same but not as markedly
(Ms are .39 and .38). Again, the predicted Priming X
Outcome Dependency X Behavior Type interaction was not
significant.
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Responses to the free-recall test were also subjected
to a Priming X Outcome Dependency X Behavior Type X
Proportion mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA)
. None
of the previously reported effects interacted with
proportion.
Attention
Subjects read and reacted to each of the 24 behavioral
statements. Each subject's average reading and reaction
time for the 12 either honest or dishonest, the 6 either
dishonest or honest, and 6 neutral behaviors was calculated
from their tape-recorded reactions to the 24 statements.
These data were then submitted to a Priming X Outcome
Dependency X Behavior Type mixed-model analysis of variance
(ANOVA) . In timing how long a subject spent reading and
reacting to the statements, the experimenter was unaware of
the experimental condition to which the subject had been
assigned. Neither Order or Set affected any of the
following analyses.
We expected that subjects primed on constructs related
to honesty would attend most to the incongruent behaviors,
and that this effect would be would more pronounced among
outcome dependent subjects. Specifically, outcome dependent
subjects primed on related constructs should attend most to
incongruent behaviors, moderately to congruent behaviors,
and least to neutral behaviors; and outcome dependent
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subjects primed on unrelated constructs should also (but not
as markedly as subjects primed on related constructs) attend
most to incongruent behaviors, moderately to congruent
behaviors, and least to neutral behaviors. A simple
interaction among Priming and Behavior Type among not-
outcome dependent subjects was predicted such that subjects
primed on related constructs should attend most to
incongruent behaviors, moderately to congruent behaviors,
and least to neutral behaviors (but not as markedly as
outcome dependent subjects) . No differences in attention
were expected among not-outcome dependent subjects primed on
unrelated constructs.
This predicted three-way interaction was not
significant. Only the Behavior Type main effect was
significant, F (2,62) = 10.45, p < .0001. Overall, subjects
spent more time attending to both the congruent (M = 10.29)
and incongruent (M = 10.65) behaviors than they did
attending to the neutral behaviors (M = .8.92). Contrast
analyses on these means indicated that the congruent and
incongruent means did not reliably differ from each other (F
< 1) , while both reliably differed from the neutral mean (F
(1,31) = 16.34, p < .01, for the incongruent and neutral
comparison, and F (1,31) = 19.15, p < .01, for the congruent
and neutral comparison) . When the attention data for the
neutral behaviors were dropped from the analysis, the effect
became nonsignificant. Thus, subjects attended more to the
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There were nothan to the irrelevant behaviors,
other significant effects in this analysis.
Correlational Analyses
As in Study 1, assuming that attention should mediate
recall, we made identical predictions for both the attention
(i.e., reading time) and recall data (Bargh & Thein, 1985).
To assess this assumption directly, three sets of zero-order
correlations were computed attention and recall (as in Study
1 and as in Bargh & Thein, 1985) : for the congruent
behaviors, for the incongruent behaviors, and for the set of
24 behaviors.
Overall, the correlation between attention and recall
for the set of 24 behaviors was not reliably different from
zero. For the congruent behaviors, the correlation between
attention and recall also was nonsignificant. And for the
incongruent behaviors, the correlation between attention and
recall was nonsignificant. These results did not vary as a
function of the between-subjects factors.
Discussion
Unlike Study 1, subjects in Study 2 formed an initial,
on-line impression of the target person on the basis of
reading the behavioral descriptions. Subjects who read the
mostly honest behaviors rated the target as more honest than
dishonest, and subjects who read the mostly dishonest
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behaviors rated the target as more dishonest than honest.
Interestingly, subjects who read the mostly honest behaviors
formed an overall positive impression of the target, as they
rated him more positively on even the unrelated, positive
traits, although the effect was smaller. Similarly,
subjects who read the mostly dishonest behaviors formed an
overall negative impression of the target, as they rated him
negatively on even the unrelated, negative traits, although
the effect was smaller. These findings are important in
that they indicate that subjects generated a clear, on-line
impression of the target, as they read the behavioral
descriptions, and that this impression was either positive
or negative depending of the proportion of statements of
either type that they had read. This on-line impression
then affected how favorably or unfavorably they judged the
person they were about to meet and interact with.
For the free-recall data, we predicted that subjects
who were primed on related constructs would recall mostly
incongruent behaviors and that this effect would be enhanced
by outcome dependency. This prediction is conceptually
equivalent to the recall prediction in Study 1. As in Study
1, the analysis of the recall data did not support this
prediction. There were some other interesting effects,
however.
Outcome-dependent subjects recalled more behaviors than
did not-outcome-dependent subjects. This may be because the
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fate of outcome-dependent subjects was contingent upon the
actions of the person they were about to meet and interact
with. Accordingly, outcome-dependent subjects were
apparently more motivated than their not-outcome-dependent
counterparts to process the information about the other
person more carefully. This is inconsistent with the
4
results of the first study. There, not-outcome-dependent
subjects recalled more behaviors than did outcome-dependent
subjects. Perhaps, this difference is due the absence of
the distraction task in Study 2. The absence of the
distraction task apparently made the subjects 's processing
objectives easier to attain.
Unlike the first study, subjects in the second study
recalled more incongruent than either congruent or neutral
behaviors. This is consistent with the findings in similar
studies (see Stangor & McMillan, 1992) . Interestingly, this
consistency effect differed as a function of priming. The
effect was only obtained for subjects primed on related
constructs. In their recent review of the literature,
Stangor and McMillan (1992) raised the possibility that the
consistency effect can be moderated by a number of factors.
Temporary accessibility is not one of the factors they
considered. Nevertheless, this finding provides some
general support for their argument and presently an attempt
is underway to see if it can be replicated. Maybe the list
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of potential moderators Stangor and McMillan describe will
have to be extended.
When the analysis was repeated with the neutral
behaviors dropped, outcome-dependent subjects primed on
related constructs recalled more behaviors than did outcome-
dependent subjects primed on unrelated constructs, whereas
the opposite was true for not-outcome-dependent subjects.
This effect was only marginal, but it appears that the
increased accessibility of the primed construct was used
more efficiently by subjects who were motivated to pay close
attention to the situation, perhaps because of their
increased need to control or predict the behavior of the
target. Further support for this interpretation comes from
the finding that outcome-dependent subjects recalled more
incongruent than congruent behaviors, and that this effect
was significantly greater for these subjects than it was for
their not-outcome-dependent counterparts. The expected
three-way interaction (involving Outcome Dependency,
Behavior Type, and Priming) was not significant in this
analysis involving proportion.
With respect to the attention data, we expected that
subjects primed on related constructs would attend most to
the incongruent behaviors, and that this effect would be
increased by outcome dependency. This is conceptually
equivalent to the attention prediction in Study 1. The
analysis did not support this prediction. The only
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significant effect from the overall analysis was that
subjects attended more to relevant than to irrelevant
behaviors, as in the first study. When the analysis was
repeated with the irrelevant (i.e., neutral) behaviors
dropped, this behavior type main effect was no longer
significant. There were no other significant effects in the
4
analysis of the attention data in this study.
As in the first study, similar predictions for the
attention (i.e., reading time) and recall data were made in
the second study, on the assumption that attention should
(but not entirely) mediate recall. To assess this
assumption, three sets of correlations were computed as
before. Unlike in Study 1, none of these was reliably
different from zero.
In conclusion, the overall recall and attention
predictions were not supported by the data in this study.
Also, the predictions were not supported by the results of
the first study. Perhaps, the failure to replicate even the
pattern observed for subjects in the rapid-paced conditions
in the Bargh and Thein (1985) study is due the different
procedures used in the studies reported here. As noted
earlier, we attempted (through different procedures) to
create a situation, primarily in the first study, analogous
to the rapid-paced condition in the Bargh and Thein study.
The inconclusive nature of the results (especially in the
first study) suggests that the attempt was not successful.
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A problem in first study, as indicated by the marginally
significant effect for outcome dependency, was that subjects
were overwhelmed by the combination of the distraction task
and the outcome dependency manipulation. The problem was
improved in the second study by dropping the distraction
task.
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While the expected overall pattern was not obtained
even in the second study, some other theoretically
interesting effects emerged from the analyses. First, the
typical recall advantage for inconsistent information was
obtained only when subjects were primed on related trait
constructs. As noted before, this finding offers some
general support for Stangor and McMillan's (1992) argument
that the consistency effect can be modified by a number of
factors. A second interesting result from the second study
was that outcome-dependent subjects were able to recall
incongruent information better than did not-outcome-
dependent subjects. This finding suggests that subjects'
goals (e.g., form an impression) in the may also modify the
typical inconsistency effect. More generally, these
findings suggest that when the typical person memory
paradigm (for a review, see Fiske & Taylor, 1991) is
modified to take into account ecologically important factors
(e.g., priming and outcome dependency), the recall advantage
for inconsistent information disappears. Further research
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may be needed to evaluate the implications of these results
for the cognitive processes involved in person perception.
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APPENDIX
PILOT STUDY
The goal in this pilot study was to assess the
effectiveness of a memory load procedure for Study 1. Bargh
and Thein (1985) had shown that the processing efficiency
associated with the use of chronically accessible trait
constructs in perceiving others becomes evident only under
memory load conditions. Specifically, they had chronics and
nonchronics read behavioral descriptions of a person named
Gregory Cullen in either a self- or rapid-paced fashion and
found enhanced recall of the "incongruent" descriptions only
among chronics in the rapid-paced condition. This pilot
study was done to determine whether having subjects perform
two distinct tasks simultaneously would create a load on
their working memory capacity (see Baddeley, 1987; Gilbert,
1989) that would in effect be equivalent to the memory-load
created in Bargh and Thein 's rapid-paced condition.
Method
Subjects and design
Thirty University of Massachusetts at Amherst
undergraduates from introductory psychology classes
participated for course credit. Ten subjects were assigned
to one of three experimental conditions. Data from one of
these subjects were dropped from the analysis of the free-
recall measure, because the subject did not understand the
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instructions. The three experimental conditions comprised a
one-way factorial design involving levels of the memory-load
variable.
Procedure. All subjects were told that there were
participating in a study on impression formation. There
were given a set of 24 behavioral descriptions attributed to
a person named Gregory Cullen. They were told
You will read each of the sentences with the goal of
forming an impression of the kind of person you believe
Gregory is like. So, after you have read a sentence
describing Gregory's behavior, you are to give your
reactions to it into the tape-recorder (Experimenter
points to the the tape-recorder on the table facing the
subject)
. These sentences are actual descriptions of
Gregory's behaviors in different situations, that we
received from different people who saw behaving in
these situations. At the end of reading and reacting
to all behavioral descriptions, you will be asked to
fill out a short questionnaire on your overal
impression of Gregory.
Twelve of the 24 behavioral descriptions were about
honest behaviors, 6 were about dishonest behaviors, and 6
were about neutral behaviors. (This variable, Information
Type, was not included in the analysis, as the focus of the
pilot study was on the memory-load factor.) These behaviors
were taken from lists of behaviors provided by Hastie
(personal communication, 1990) . Subjects were told that
once they had read and given their reactions to a sentence,
they were to move onto the next sentence and not look back
at the previous one.
The memory-load variable was manipulated as follows.
All subjects were told that another goal in this study was
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to see how people perform two different tasks at the same
time. They were told that the first task involves reading
and reacting to the behavioral descriptions and that the
second task involves subtracting 3 from a either a 6- or 8-
digit number. Specifically, after they had read and reacted
to a sentence describing a behavior, they were to repeat the
number out loud with three subtracted from it into the tape-
recorder. Before they started reading the set of 24
behavioral descriptions, the experimenter gave the subjects
the number and asked them to memorize it. Subjects in the
O-digit condition merely read and reacted out loud to each
of the 24 behavioral descriptions.
Dependent Measures . Attention (i.e., reading time) was
measured by using each subject's tape-recorded reactions to
assess how long each subject spent reading and reacting to
each of the behavioral descriptions. All subjects were then
given a surprised free-recall test. They were instructed to
try and recall as many of the behavioral descriptions as
they could, in any order but as close to the original
wording as possible. In coding the recall responses, the
experimenter was unaware of which of the three experimental
conditions a subject had been assigned to.
Subjects next completed an impression rating form.
This form consisted of 12 trait adjectives, and the subject
was to rate the target person on 11-point rating scales,
ranging from 0 for not at all x to 10 for extremely_x. Half
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of the trait adjectives were related to honesty and half not
related to honesty. Half of the related and unrelated trait
adjectives were positive and half were negative. The trait
adjectives on the impression rating form were presented in
the same random order to each subject.
All subjects were thoroughly debriefed, given credit,
and thanked for their participation.
Results and Discussion
As the focus of this pilot study is on the memory-load
factor, only the free-recall data will be reported. We used
a strict criterion in coding responses on the surprised
free-recall test. This criterion required that subject's
recalled description differs from the presented presented
description in at most one word (verb or object)
,
so long as
this did not change the meaning of the presented
description. Of the number of descriptions a subject
recalled, the experimenter calculated the proportion
correct. The experimenter was blind to which of the three
memory-load conditions a given subject had been assigned to.
A oneway analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the
subjects' proportion correctly free recalled. Subjects in
the O-digit condition correctly recalled more of the
behavioral descriptions (M = .28) than did subjects in
either the 6- (M = 16) or 8-digit (M = .16) condition, F
(2, 26) = 3.49, p < .05. A focused comparison revealed that
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the proportion correctly recalled in the O-digit condition
was higher than the average proportion correctly recalled in
either of the other two conditions, t (26) = -4.48, p < .05.
The results of the pilot study indicated that having
subjects perforin two tasks simultaneously created a burden
on the working-memory capacity (i.e., attention). In the
actual study, we used the 6-digit number as part of our
procedure to overload subjects' attention capacity. There
all subjects were required to subtract 3 from the 6-digit
number, after they had read and reacted out loud to each of
the 24 behavioral descriptions.
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